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Bill: Military Reforms

Details

Submitted by[?]: Radical Democratic Party

Status[?]: passed

Votes: This bill is a resolution. It requires more yes votes than no votes. This bill will not pass any sooner than the deadline.

Voting deadline: September 2181

Description[?]:

We are submitting this proposal to kick off the discussion on what our Armed Forces should be. Our main interest is in the Armed Forces' composition and equipment, so that we can update the defence budget soon.

Please vote in favor if you broadly agree with this document. If you disagree with any of the numbered proposals, make sure to mention this as you vote. We will not implement (or budget for) any proposal that is not supported by a majority of the Assembly. We expect many more such bills as the discussion gets going.

OOC: These proposals should be additions rather than substitutions to the existing Wiki article, especially by adding a section on "order of battle". Any substitutions will be put on a "trial" Wiki article before incorporation to the "real" article.

__________________________________________________________________

This is intended as a forum for the standing defense commission to discuss ideas for reforming our military. The RDP proposes the following reforms:

1. "INDRALAN DEFENSE FORCE": We propose changing the name of our Armed Forces to better convey our country's peaceful nature. (OOC: as in Japan's "Self-Defence Force")

2. NO SURRENDER: We propose that no one be granted the constitutional authority to surrender Indrala. All surrender documents are to be treated as military propaganda. This will convey to would-be aggressors our determination to resist to the end. (OOC: This worked wonders for Switzerland in WWII, when it deterred the far more powerful Axis from invading.)

3. UNIFIED FORCE: We propose to reap economies of scale, introducing commonaly of training, doctrine and equipment whenever convenient. There is no reason why basic infantry training, or the standard assault rifle, should be any different in the Army, Navy or Air Force. We want individuals to be able to move between the services as necessary. We want to end the turf wars and separate research establishments.

4. MILITIA SYSTEM: Our all-professional military is of extremely high quality, but we have almost no reserves. We propose that a part-time voluntary militia be trained and equipped, mostly as infantry specialising in urban, mountain or jungle fighting, or as civil defence troops. We propose five infantry division equivalents, one based in each of Indrala's regions, at a total cost of INS 15 billion per annum. (OOC: This would be similar to the US National Guard).

5. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: We believe that our strategic nuclear deterrent should be wholly submarine-based, to avoid surprise. We want at least 6 SLBM submarines, three of which should be on patrol at any given time. (OOC: Similar to the Ohio classs. The UK nuclear deterrent is likewise wholly submarine-based.) Estimated cost per ship: INS 50 million in operating costs, INS 160 million in acquisition costs (INS 2 billion over 20 years).

6. STRATEGIC WARNING SYSTEM: Includes hardened and airborne command systems (OOC: similar to the E-4B), as well as surveillance satellites. Estimated cost: INS 1 billion per annum.

7. INTERVENTION FORCE: Our international commitments require that we have a division-sized force that can be deployed at short notice anywhere in the world. This would be build around a mixed division, with paratroop, armoured and light infantry components, heavily supported by attack helicopters and a fighter-bomber wing. Estimated cost: INS 3.5 billion per annum.

8. PEACEKEEPING FORCE: Specialising in low-intensity warfare. This would be built around a light infantry division, with some light armour and helicopter support. Estimated cost: INS3 billion per annum, to be taken from the foreign aid budget.

9. SURFACE NAVY: We suggest 4 battle groups, three for commerce protection and one to support forces deployed overseas. Each battle group will consist of:
- 1 nuclear light aircraft carrier, carrying 12 V/STOL fighter bombers and various ASW, attack, and transport helicopters (OOC: similar to a LHX or Tarawa class). Estimated cost: INS 75 million in operating costs, INS 400 million in acquisition cost (INS 3 billion ship plus 2 billion in aircraft over 20 years).
- 2 destroyers (OOC: similar to a DDG-51 class). Estimated cost: INS 20 million in operating costs, INS 72 million in acquisition costs (INS 900 million over 20 years) each.
- 1 attack submarine (OOC: similar to a Seawolf class). Estimated cost: INS 21 million in operating costs, INS 144 million in acquisition costs (INS 1.8 billion over 20 years).
- 1 supply ship. Estimated cost: ???
The total cost per battle group is estimated at INS 800 million per annum.

10. HOME DEFENCE DOCTRINE: Any invasion of Indrala will depend on seaborne forces. Our first line of defence will be the destruction of enemy vessels by Indralan bombers and submarines. It will be critical to maintain air superiority over Indrala and its territiorial waters. If an invasion force establishes a beachhead, we propose that:
a) The infantry delays it with guerrilla tactics, giving time to
b) Armoured forces to contain the breakthrough, so that
c) Bombers and attack helicopters can destroy the enemy forces and
d) Armoured and infantry units can mop them up.

11. AIR DEFENCE: We propose to establish 8 brigades (wings) of some 72 stealth fighters each: one brigade to defend each Canton, one to support the Intervention Force, and two in reserve. Estimated total cost: Estimated cost: INS 5 million in munition and operating costs, INS 8 million in acquisition costs (INS 100 million over 20 years) per aircraft. Total INS 1.2 billion per 72-aircraft brigade, including airbases.

12. INTERDICTION: We propose to establish 4 stealth bomber brigades (OOC: aircraft similar to the F-117), to attack enemy naval and land forces, airbases, etc: one for deployment overseas, one for counter-air operations, and two in reserve. Estimated cost: INS 3 million in munition and operating costs, INS 10 million in acquisition costs (INS 122 million over 20 years) per aircraft. Total INS 1.2 billion per 72-aircraft brigade, including airbases.

13. SUBMARINES: Besides the carrier battle groups, we want a force of 12 nuclear attack submarines, to deny use of the sea to our enemies, especially any invasion force. 6 of these submarines attack enemy shipping throughout the world, and 6 will be held in reserve to attack any invasion fleet. Estimated cost: INS 2 billion per annum total.

14. FULL-TIME LAND FORCES: We propose the creation of 6 armoured brigades, one to be deployed in each of Indrala's Cantons and one in reserve. (OOC: This would equal to 2 full armoured divisions.) We also want an airborne/air assault division to be held in reserve. Estimated cost: INS 11 billion per annum.

15. SPECIAL FORCES: We want all of our regular infantry units to be of a quality similar to special forces. But there should be a specialist Special Forces command, with various specialties and equivalent to at least a brigade in numbers. Special forces will undertake reconnaissance, counter-terrorism and deep strike missions. We must not flinch from eliminating the enemy's political and military leadership through appropriate missions. Estimated cost: 2 billion per annum.

16. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: We want the ability to drop a paratroop brigade in one go, requiring some 50 transport aircraft (OOC: similar to the C-17). Estimated cost: INS 6 million in operating costs, INS 14 million in acquisition costs (INS 170 million over 20 years) per aircraft. We are studying the possibility of reducing costs by providing air freight services in peacetime.

17. MINE WARFARE: 3 oceangoing minesweepers (OOC: similar to the MCM-1 class). Estimated cost: INS 5 million in operating costs, INS 12 million in acquisition costs (INS 150 million over 20 years) each. 6 coastal minesweepers (OOC: similar to the MHC 51 class). Estimated cost: INS 3 million in operating costs, INS 8 million in acquisition costs (INS 100 million over 20 years) each.

18. TOTAL COST: We believe that the Ministry of Defence needs a budget of INS 60 billion per annum to maintain these forces. We further suggest allocating another INS 10 billion per annum to military research, in collaboration with our closest allies.

19. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE: We propose to continue encouraging individual members or units of the Indralan Armed Forces to volunteer in conflicts which have a clear humanitarian or democratic component. This has provided invaluable combat experience to our military and our arms industry.

OOC: Acquisition costs are costed at a 5% per year rate.

ARMY COSTING: The US Army had, in 2002, 23 division equivalents (10 active, 8 National Guard, 15 separate Brigades). It had 480,000 men, 300,000 of them in operational units, and had a budget of $78 billion. This works out at $3.4 billion per division. Even with better pay and equipment, the lack of Pentagon corruption and turf fighting would allow us to be somewhere in this range. See http://web.mit.edu/SSP/fall02/kaufman.htm.

NAVAL FORCES: See http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/index.html and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lhx.htm.

AIR FORCES: See http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/index.html.

Proposals

Debate

These messages have been posted to debate on this bill:

Date15:36:44, February 04, 2006 CET
FromLiberal Democratic Party of Indrala
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageDo you know why the model as detailed in point 3. is almost unheard of?

Date16:35:51, February 04, 2006 CET
FromRadical Democratic Party
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageOOC: As far as I know, a unified command structure is used in Canada, Switzerland and Austria. And I am quite familiar with the inter-service turf wars in the United States. I would welcome the arguments against.

Date22:42:15, February 04, 2006 CET
FromLiberal Democratic Party of Indrala
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageHaving separate branches doesn't preclude unified command, and Canada still retains its separate branches in many ways. The problem of inter-service turf wars isn't common outside the US, so having separate branches cannot be solely responsible. Many nations have a similar structure without the same difficulty. We shouldn't assume the Indralan military has the same problems.

Date00:51:18, February 05, 2006 CET
FromRadical Democratic Party
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageYes, but what is the case for having separate services? For instance, what have SLBMs in common with carrier battle groups? And either with mineswepers?

Date01:30:16, February 05, 2006 CET
FromHeradite Yunitou
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageWe support. This would strengthen the defence of Indrala.

Date01:54:13, February 05, 2006 CET
FromLiberal Democratic Party of Indrala
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageThe obvious answer would be that all are maritime-based. Having separate branches allows for a greater degree of specialisation. Soldiers and support staff will be more proficient. An engineer trained to work on aircraft, tanks and ships' engines will not be as reliable as one who is trained especially for a specific task. In areas where commonality is required, the minister can issue directives so unecessary differences do not exist between the branches.

Date02:33:59, February 05, 2006 CET
FromRadical Democratic Party
ToDebating the Military Reforms
MessageTrue. But isn't the difference between, say, an army helicopter pilot and a tank commander much greater than that between an army helicopter pilot and a navy helicopter pilot? Shouldn't all helicopter pilots receive their basic training in the same place? Shouldn't army helicopter pilots be allowed to become navy helicopter pilots relatively easily?

A unified command would not preclude specialisation. On the contrary, it would make specialisation possible along rational lines. But, in any case, the differences between land, air, and sea forces would be maintained to the extent that they make sense.

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Voting

Vote Seats
yes
   

Total Seats: 53

no

    Total Seats: 0

    abstain
         

    Total Seats: 47


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