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Bill: Lex Centralis Banco Dissignatio
Details
Submitted by[?]: Partis Communis Seluciae
Status[?]: passed
Votes: This is an ordinary bill. It requires more yes votes than no votes. This bill will not pass any sooner than the deadline.
Voting deadline: June 4471
Description[?]:
| In order to protect the nation's financial interests, the Pars Laborem candidate for Finance, Flavius Gessia, has proposed that the government should have the ability to interfere with the operations of the Central Bank. |
Proposals
Article 1
Proposal[?] to change Central Bank oversight and regulation (if a central bank exists)
Old value:: The government appoints the head of the central bank and an executive board to manage the central bank but does not otherwise interfere in its operations.
Current: The government appoints the head of the central bank and an executive board to manage the central bank but does not otherwise interfere in its operations.
Proposed: The government appoints the head of the central bank and an executive board to manage the central bank and can interfere with its operations.
Debate
These messages have been posted to debate on this bill:
| Date | 12:42:04, October 16, 2018 CET | From | Factio Republicana Socialistica | To | Debating the Lex Centralis Banco Dissignatio |
| Message | Senators, We support this proposal, as long as we have a guarantee that the institutional independence of the Central Bank will remain intact. Under current legislation (http://classic.particracy.net/viewbill.php?billid=576869) the Central Bank is subject to democratic election and oversight, but given its larger importance in Selucia as the sole institution with the power of seigniorage, we fear that subjecting it to political pressure could have disastrous consequences. How does the Labor Party propose to increase oversight over the Central Bank without having it succumb to short-term electoral and partisan pressures? Quintina Samara Minister of Finance |
| Date | 15:52:53, October 16, 2018 CET | From | Partis Communis Seluciae | To | Debating the Lex Centralis Banco Dissignatio |
| Message | Senators, Obviously, it is difficult to avoid partisan influence even under the current system of appointment. We would propose that in order to manage this that the appointed be politically neutral and not a member of any political party. We would also propose that interference only occurs in times of economic crisis or ecological and natural disasters. Flavius Gessia Candidate for Minister of Finance. |
| Date | 17:26:57, October 17, 2018 CET | From | Optimates | To | Debating the Lex Centralis Banco Dissignatio |
| Message | Senators, This is a simply absurd proposal. The independence of the central bank cannot be guaranteed so long as the state has the power to interfere with the operations of the supposedly independent central bank, however the opposition might try to spin it. The threat of intervention shall always be enough to cow the central bank, and would be yet another example of the government having a look-in where it frankly has no business whatsoever. Senator Septimus Sertorius Bruccius |
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Voting
| Vote | Seats | |||
| yes | Total Seats: 453 | |||
| no |
Total Seats: 297 | |||
| abstain | Total Seats: 0 |
| Random fact: It is forbidden to impersonate a player or Moderator. |
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